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ABSTRACT 
This paper is the second in a series on technological and 
organisational change within the Australian clothing 
industry, and forms part of the research project entitled 
'A Local Division of Production : Technological Change and 
Productive lnterlinkages in Australian Manufacturing'. 
The purpose of this second paper is to examine in greater 
detail how new production concepts have been translated 
at the clothing manufacturing enterprise level. These 
changing production techniques are empirically explored 
through the 'lens' of the post-fordist paradigm. The 
study concludes that although most companies have had 
to introduce varying degrees of flexibilty into their 
operations, this flexibility cannot legitimately be 
described as post-fordist. A cautionary note is also 
raised: when examining technological and organisational 
change in the clothing industry it is not enough to look at 
individual firms as self-contained units; any useful 
analysis must also take account of the practice of sub-
co nt ra ct i ng and strategic interlinkages between 
companies . 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper is the second in a series on technological and organisational 
change within the Australian clothing industry, and forms part of the 
research project entitled 'A Local Division of Production: Technological 
Change and Productive Interlinkages in Australian Manufacturing'. The 
first paper examined the evolving relationship between large retailers and 
their manufacturing suppliers and argued that in order to understand 
changes within the industry it is essential to appreciate the key role 
retailers have performed in altering quality control and. production 
practices at the manufacturing level (Greig, 1990). 
The purpose of this second paper is to examine in greater detail how new 
production concepts have been translated at the clothing manufacturing 
enterprise level. These changing production techniques are empirically 
explored through the 'lens' of the post-fordist paradigm. 
The first part of the paper outlines post-fordist theories and provides an 
historical interpretation of the crisis of fordism and the emergence of the 
post-fordist alternative. The second part of the paper takes up the 
challenge of Richard Badham and John Mathews' research agenda by 
applying their 'ideal-type' post-fordist model to the clothing industry. 
l I would like to express my gratitude to Barry Hindess, Frank Jones, Jane Marceau and Di Bolton for reading an earlier draft of this paper, and to the numerous individuals 
employed by the firms and organisations interviewed in the study. Through previous 
agreement the individuals and firms remain anonomous. All unacknowledged 
references and quotations reflect the commercial-in-confidence nature of the information 
supplied. This paper was presented to the Ur!?an Research Program Seminar Series, R.S.S.S., A.N.U., 8 October, 1990. 
Firstly, it is demonstrated that the rhetoric of post-fordism can be found 
within the technical literature in the industry. Secondly, using 18 case 
studies representing most of Australia's largest clothing companies, the 
key indicators of Badham and Mathews' post-fordist model (namely, 
product innovation, process variability and worker responsibility) are 
operationalised. The results indicate that while most companies have had 
to introduce varying degrees of flexibility into their operations, this 
flexibility is 'static' rather than 'dynamic', and corresponds more closely 
to Badham and Mathews' 'neo-fordist' level rather than post-fordism. 
Finally, the paper issues a note of caution, pointing out that the individual 
firm is often an unreliable unit of analysis for applying Badham and 
Mathews' model to the clothing industry. The practice of sub-contracting 
underlines the importance of taking into consideration strategic 
interlinkages between companies when examining technological and 
organisational change in the industry. 
POST-FORDIST THEORIES 
Over the past decade a number of concepts relating to post-fordism have 
entered the literature on industrial and organisational change, including 
'flexible specialisation' (Piore & Sabel, 1984), 'diversified quality 
production' (see Campbell, 1989) and 'disorganised capitalism' (Lash & 
Urry, 1987). While Hirst & Zeitlin (1990) have pointed out that these 
concepts represent distinct theoretical, methodological and policy 
approaches to the study of industrial change, the term post-fordism will 
be used in this paper as a generic term for three main reasons. Firstly, 
the debate within Australia has mainly centred around the concept of 
post-fordism (see Mathews, 1989a, 1989b; Bramble, 1988, 1990; 
Campbell, 1990; Hindess, 1990). Secondly, the empirical component of 
this paper will operationalise the post-fordist model developed by John 
Badham and John Mathews (Badham & Mathews, 1989). Thirdly, 
Mathews work on post-fordism represents one of the most ambitious 
attempts to synthesize and advance the observations and generalisations of 
the various positions within the literature. 
In order to appreciate Mathews' claims, and place his model in historical 
perspective, it is first necessary to understand what post-fordism is, and 
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what it claims to transcend, namely fordism. Like the term 'flexible 
specialisation' coined by Piore and Sabel in their seminal work The 
Second Industrial Divide, post-fordism describes the tendency over the 
past decade for producers to move away from the stand_ardised 
production of goods for a mass market utilising an intense in-house 
division of labour, dedicated machinery and economies of scale towards 
the production of smaller batch runs of more customised products for a 
more diversified market, using more flexible machinery and a more 
flexible multiskilled workforce. Adapting T.S. Kuhn's approach to 
scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 1970) others, such as Chris Freeman and 
Carlota Perez, argue that this transformation of methods of production 
represents the emergence of a new dominant 'techno-economic paradigm' 
Freeman & Perez, 1988). 
The concepts of fordism and post-fordism are used by theorists such as 
Mathews as 'ideal types', or 'unified analytical constructs' (Weber, 1949), 
serving to define the most significant features of competing paradigms 
with the purpose of explication. The prime 'value reference' for 
Mathews is the extent to which one system of production is being 
superceded by another. According to Mathews, the fordist paradigm 
'gives us a conceptual handle on reality' (Mathews, 1989a: 30) for 
understanding the stability which western capitalism achieved between the 
end of the Second World War and the beginning of the 1970's . . More 
importantly, this conceptual tool provides an explanation for the 'crisis of 
mass production', its inherent limitations, and also helps map the possible 
contours of future industrial change.2 While examples of post-fordist 
techniques can be found in production units well before the 1970's (see 
Sayer, 1985; Aganbegyan, 1988; McMillan, 1984; Dore, 1986) post-
fordist theorists argue that it has only been since the mid-1970's that the 
post-fordist techno-economic paradigm has emerged as a serious 
contender to the previously dominant system of mass fordist methods of 
organising production. 
2 It should be pointed out that Mathews goes beyond the Weberian notion of an ideal type 
by deriving an 'ought' from the empirical world. This 'ought', worker-oriented post-
fordism, is to be achieved through 'strategically informed intervention ... organised 
around a politics of democratisation' (Mathews, I 989a: 39). 
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In the field of sociological theory, the post-fordist debate has refocussed 
manufacturing as an important topic of investigation, tempering the 
overstated 'post-industrial' thesis made by commentators such as Daniel 
Bell (Bell, 1973). Indeed, one of the most fruitful contributions to 
industrial sociology of the post-fordist deoate has ben the recognition of 
the interdependency of production and the 'information society' (see 
Cohen & Zysman, 1987). Echoes of the post-fordist debate have also 
reverberated through labour process theory, and the left in particular are 
divided over the meaning and political implications of post-fordism. 
While Mathews views post-fordism as a potentially emancipatory force, 
others, such as Tom Bramble, see it as the latest tactic employed by 
capital to control labour and ensure the generation of surplus value 
(Bramble, 1988, 1990). 
One final theoretical comment needs to be made in order to clarify the 
focus of this paper. The concepts of fordism and post-fordism have often 
been used to describe two separate, yet interrelated, phenomena of social 
change. Firstly, it has been employed to describe organisational and 
technical developments within individual units of production. Secondly, 
it has been used in a more 'totalising' sense to descibe changing patterns 
of production, consumption and institutions at a broader societal level. 
Mathews uses the broader level of analysis to inform his discussion of 
changes at the enterprise level. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate 
Mathews' claims on the enterprise level through applying his post-fordist 
model to changes occurring in a particular sector of Australian industry, 
namely the clothing industry. It therefore addresses the post-fordist 
debate on the more restricted meaning of the term. 
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF POST-FORDISM 
However, before examining Mathews' model of post-fordist change at the 
enterprise level it is useful to place it within the broader understanding of 
changes taking place in patterns of production and consumption. The 
purpose of this section is descriptive. It is not intended to be a critique of 
Mathews' social theory. It sets the contextual framework within which 
Mathews approaches changes at the enterprise level. Mathews' totalising 
framework for explaining these changes borrows heavily from the 
French Regulation School. This school has combined Marxism with 
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functionalist sociology in order to explain the inner dynamics and 
reproduction of the capitalist system.3 According to the French 
Regulation School any regime of accumulation, or model of capitalist 
economic growth, requires corresponding modes of regulation, or 
institutional forms, to assure its reproduction. These institutional forms 
involving the organisation of consumption and negotiation help to ensure 
the regulation of the mode of production (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1987). 
Carlota Perez adopts a similar stance when she argues that the capitalist 
mode of production consists of two interrelated sub-systems, a techno-
economic sub-system and a social and institutional sub-system. The 
smooth operation of the mode of production requires that an equilibrium 
exist between the techno-economic and the socio-institutional mechanisms 
(Perez, 1983, 1985). 
In the popular sense fordism has come to mean a specific form of work 
organisation based upon mass production and the assembly line. Henry 
Ford's introduction of the moving conveyor belt for assembling Model-T 
Fords at Highland Park in Detriot in 1913 is presented as the harbinger 
of this system of production. Linked to Fredrick Taylor's system of 
scientific management of work organisation and its accompanying 
'degradation of labour', it is often argued that this innovation shaped the 
contours of the twentieth century. According to the post-fordist 
theorists, this fordist techno-economic paradigmatic shift, or the 'first 
industrial divide', led to the need to bring the social and institutional 
mechanisms into line with the new techno-economic advances. ·Between 
the wars, the advances in productivity and accumulation resulting from 
the new production and organisational techniques associated with mass 
production of standardised goods, the assembly line and Taylorist work 
organisation led to a crisis of industrial capitalism. In functionalist terms, 
the techno-economic and the socio-institutional sub-systems of capitalism 
were in a state of disequilibrium. As Michel Aglietta points out, during 
the 1920's the fordist system of regulation faltered because 'the working 
class market could not yet be reached under the social conditions of 
production at the time' (Aglietta, 1979: 88). 
3 One disciple of the school, Alain Lipietz, concedes to an a posterior, or metaphoric, 
functionalism ('It is as though .. .'). However, cenain critics, such as Hirst and Zeitlin (1990) and Daniel Cataife (1988), have also accused the French Regulationists, such as 
Aglietta and Lipietz, of adopting a functionalist position. 
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According to Mathews, 'the need for markets to be created for mass 
produced goods from the 1920's onwards, underlies many of the social 
and economic developments that are conventionally seen as arising 
independently' (Mathews, 1989a: 27). While Ford's $5 day and the New 
Deal can be interpreted in this manner, Mathews and other post-fordist 
theorists argue that the rise of the post-Second World War interventionist 
state and Keynesian demand-side policies were the most important factors 
which brought the socio-institutional and the techno-economic sub-
systems into equilibrium. These developments facilitated a stable mass 
consumer market for mass production and assured, until the early-1970's, 
the reproduction of the fordist regime of accumulation. Apart from the 
direct demand generated by expanding state expenditure, welfare 
measures such as social security helped diminish the cycles of boom and 
bust, and deflected much of the discontent and social disruption 
previously characterising recessions and slumps. Furthermore, the 
Bretton Woods agreement attempted to stabilise international trade 
through fixed exchange rates tied to the powerful U.S. dollar. 
Annemieke Roobeek further argues that in Europe and elsewhere social 
democratic parties and/or labour unions 'gained strong positions in the 
post-war period, which were translated into strong bargaining positions 
in the corporatist decision-making process and the building of the welfare 
state' (Roobeek, 1987: 135). Unions, fighting and bargaining on the 
strength of representing deskilled Taylorised labour, performed a 
functional role in maintaining the overall stability of the system by 
generating mass consumption market demand. 
Other phenomena of regulation mentioned by Roobeek include the 
growing spheres of the commodification of the means of consumption 
and the extension of consumer credit facilities. She also argues that the 
post-war expansion of suburbanisation 'which can be seen as a socio-
economic innovation, made the integration of the auto-house-electrical 
appliance complex possible' (Roobeek, 1987: 133). From the post-fordist 
perspective, these social and institutional changes enabled the long post-
war boom to materialise. The changes promoted a syncronicity with the 
dominant techno-economic sub-system, fordism, by providing stabilised · 
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mass markets for standardised products produced through mass 
production techniques by ever-expanding corporations. 
This regime of accumulation based upon the fordist production system 
began to manifest signs of crisis in the late-l 960's and early-1970's. 
Roobeek has listed a number of factors which limited and restricted the 
expansion of fordism and its regime of accumulation (Roobeek, 1987: 
136-40; for similar accounts, see Mathews, 1989a; van Tulder & Junne, 
1988). 
One reflection of the inherent limits within the fordist system was 
declining productivity growth. Durable mass consumer goods had 
reached a maturity phase due to declining demand and the inability to 
find new markets.4 Another related factor of the crisis of fordism was 
the divergence between the decline in productivity and wage growth. As 
mentioned above, fordism and the post-war growth had increased the 
bargaining position of labour and encouraged the regulation of labour. 
Despite declining productivity growth during the 1970's, unions were 
still able to secure wage increases. As Roobeek (1987:138) points out, 
'the regulation of wages gave the employers, finding themselves faced 
with falling productivity growth and a saturated market, reason to 
complain about rigid a11u iniiexible labour ~~ !:. ;ions '. Capital responded 
by demanding new, more flexible , forms of labour contracts and work 
practices, which would reflect growing market instability and fluctuating 
profit margins. 
Furthermore, mass fordist production techniques were easily emulated, 
and competition within industry sectors led to the saturation of mass 
markets, limiting market expansion. The internationalisation of these 
markets in durable consumer goods soon reached limits during the 1970's 
as developing countries faced growing debt burdens. The resulting 
monetarist policies and the austerity measures forced upon the people of 
these debt-ridden nations hardly encouraged the mass market for durable 
4 Another factor influencing declining productivity growth was growing governmental 
regulation in areas such as occupational health and safety, and in environmental controls 
over the growing problem of pollution. Furthermore, fordism was premised upon 
unlimited access to cheap raw materials and cheap fuel. The oil crisis of 1973-4 
provoked a sharp reminder that this premise was indeed shaky. Resultant rises in prices 
spurred a search for new technologies and new materials. 
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consumer goods which had promoted the post-war boom in the 
industrialised west.S 
In order to overcome this cns1s many companies relocated labour-
intensive aspects of the production process in low-wage countries, 
thereby reducing labour costs. However, while this may have advantaged 
individual firms, the resort to low-wage Third World labour adversely 
affected the systemic fordist equilibrium between production and 
consumption on a societal level within western nations. As jobs were 
rationalised away, the states' financial burdens increased further through 
rising expenditure on unemployment benefits. The internationalisation of 
production also triggered a c1isis in Keynesianism, as more and more 
uncontrollable leaks to foreign markets exacerbated the problem of 
ensuring the sub-systemic national equilibrium upon which fordism was 
based: 
However, for the purposes of this paper the most important question is 
how the crisis of fordism manifested itself at the level of individual units 
of production. Roobeek lists four problems directly related to the 
enterprise level. Firstly, fordism's structural overcapacity began to 
manifest itself in growing inventory problems. As demand declined 
firms were forced to invest in increased storage capacity for unsold 
goods, which increased non-productive operating costs. In tum, these 
problems highlighted the inflexibility of fordist production technologies 
and organisational strategies, which were unable to produce optimal 
volumes and diversify production quickly in response to changing 
demand. 
5 Roobeek also argues that the crisis in fordist regulation was occasioned by the 
increasing costs for public services for the middle class. In the original fordist model 
state-provided social services were intended to shelter the working class from the 
effects of economic recession. However, these services became increasingly concerned 
with the needs of the middle class (and suburbanised society) who came to define 
welfare needs and appropriated them in terms of their own interests and requirements. 
As the working class took advantage of these expanding services the cost to the state 
escalated, helping to usher in the 'fiscal crisis of the state'. While the term 'fiscal crisis 
of the state' has been used here, it should be pointed out that Roobeek does not 
highlight one of James O'Connor's principal theses, namely that 'the socialization of 
the costs of social investment and social consumption capital increases over time and 
increasingly is needed for profitable accumulation by monopoly capitaf (O'Connor, 
19783: 8, emphasis added). 
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Secondly, the crisis of fordism manifested itself in poor quality control. 
While competition and saturated markets placed a premium on quality, 
the organisation of fordist production was unable to guarantee it. High 
rejection rates of components and materials on one hand, and finished 
goods on the other, came to be seen as an unacceptable cost as 
productivity growth declined. However, the technical equipment was not 
available to systematically check quality. Furthermore, de skilled 
Taylorised work and authoritarian work relations did not encourage 
worker involvement in quality control at the point of production. Many 
companies began to recognise the relationship between the quality of 
work and the quality of production. As critics of Braverman and critics 
of 'actually existing socialism' pointed out, high labour turnover, 
absenteeism and various forms of industrial sabotage were forms of 
worker resistance to the degradation of labour under alienated conditions 
of work,(see Braverman, 1973; Stark, 1980; Ticktin, 1973). 
The international dispersal of production also resulted in a further 
problem of fordist control. This was the logistic problem of 
coordinating the assembly and delivery of parts from around the globe. 
Final production costs rose due to the increased interest paid on transit of 
parts and final goods, while global production hindered firms' ability to 
respond flexibly to changes in local markets. Once again, as with the 
problem of structural overcapacity, this problem highlighted the need for 
new production, distribution and logistical systems which could respond 
quickly to market changes. 
Roobeek also lists growing bureaucratisation as a control problem for 
fordism. Like the interventionist state, as fordist corporations expanded, 
their rules and regulations grew more complex. This 'iron cage' resulted 
in 'inflexible, slow, rigid decision-making' procedures which were 
reflected in increased production costs. 
Roobeek's enumeration of difficulties encountered by the fordist regime 
of accumulation and control highlights the complex relationship which 
exists between the techno-economic sub-system and the social and 
institutional sub-system. The crisis of fordism was not occassioned 
merely by production and economic factors. These factors cannot be 
viewed in isolation from the social and institutional factors which 
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promoted fordist accumulation in the first place. Furthermore, as 
Mathews argues, by grasping fordism as an analytical construct, it is 
possible to explain the crisis faced by individual units of production 
during the l 970's. It also sets the contemporary challenge of industrial 
restructuring within a wider socio-economic context. 
THE POST-FORDIST CHALLENGE 
The fordist paradigm also helps reveal the possible responses available to 
companies in their attempt to overcome its crisis. The variety of 
responses all have one imperative in common, namely the search for 
flexibility. Indeed, the 'flexible firm' became the catchphrase of British 
managers during the 1980's, and Piore and Sabel use the term flexible 
specialisation to distinguish post-fordism from fordist mass production. 
Greater flexibility was sought throughout all aspects of the production 
and distribution process, from flexibility in product range to capture the 
needs of a differentiating market, to flexibility in the production process 
to enable firms to respond rapidly to these changes. Therefore, 
flexibility affected both the technology utilised within a firm and also the 
managerial and operational strategies adopted by the firm. In order to 
overcome the limitations of fordism, the flexible post-fordist firm would 
have to reorient its activities to take into account the need for a 
differentiated product variety to meet the needs of a more uncertain 
market. Production runs would consequently have to be made in smaller 
batch sizes. This would alleviate the problem of inventory control over 
incoming supplies and finished goods. Decentralisation of functions 
would overcome the difficulties surrounding complex rules and 
regulations while the problems associated with employee relations would 
be tackled through reversing the trend towards deskilled Taylorised work 
organisation and encouraging skill upgrading and multiskilling. Flexible 
workplace practices were required, either through broadening the 
workers' range of activities (functional flexibility) and/or through 
temporary or non-standard contracts with workers peripheral to the core 
activities of the firm (numerical flexibility, or distancing). 
However, John Atkinson has urged caution in the use of the term 
'flexibility' for three reasons. The first is that the range of subjects 
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covered by the term is extremely broad. Secondly, the range of groups 
and institutions affected is also very broad and flexibility· affects these 
constituents in different ways. Thirdly, 'its use is often blatantly 
ideological, reflecting our cultural disposition to value flexibility .... over 
inflexibility' (Atkinson, 1987). He therefore makes the distinction 
between 'dynamic' and 'static' forms of flexibility. Dynamic flexibility 
refers to 'changes to institutional, cultural and other social or economic 
regulations and practices which permanently increase the capacity to 
respond to change' (Atkinson, 1987). On the other hand, static aspects of 
flexibility refer to 'one-off accommodations to particular pressures, 
which leave one no better placed to respond to further pressures' 
(Atkinson, 1987) 
While John Mathews has not used this distinction in his book Tools for 
Change: New Technology and the Democratisation of Work and in 
numerous recent articles, his discussion of the various strategies adopted 
by firms to overcome the limitations of fordism complements Atkinson. 
Mathews distinguishes between neo-fordist and post-fordist approaches: 
the former resembling static forms of flexibility and the latter resembling 
dynamic forms . Neo-fordist strategies can in turn be sub-divided into 
forms of either intensification or modification towards innovation and 
specialisation. Intensification involves 'expanding outwards on a world 
scale; contracting inwards ... ; or rationalising and reorganising 
production, utilising computers, along Taylorist lines', or what Mathews 
calls 'computer-assisted Taylorism' (Mathews, 1989a: 31 ). 
The first two forms of intensification have been dealt with above under 
Roobeek's discussion of the limitations of fordism, and would be more 
accurately described as fordist strategies. However, computer-assisted 
Taylorist intensification does represent an attempt to overcome fordist 
limitations through introducing flexibility by utilising advances in micro-
electronics to integrate aspects of production, speed up flows of 
information between departments, customers and suppliers, reduce wage 
costs and increase productivity. Mathews argues that computerised 
Taylorist intensification has had mixed results, but ultimately fails to 
overcome the structural crisis of fordism. 
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Computerisation of production is certainly leading to 
productivity gains - but while it is applied along Taylorist lines, 
it quickly comes up against structural limits in the form of poor 
quality goods or inflexibility of supply. The divorce of 
conception from execution - the basic Taylorist principle - has 
led to productivity gains in a simple mechanically-based mass 
production system, but firms are finding that it represents an 
absolute limit to productivity growth in complex computer-
integrated manufacturing systems, where worker flexibility and 
power of innovation are at a premium. (Mathews, 1989a: 32) 
According to Mathews, the second form of neo-fordism, involving 
increasing specialisation and product diversification, also reaches limits 
imposed by fordist strategies. While these strategies enable firms to tap 
into niche markets and produce higher value-added goods, by taking 
advantage of advanced computerised technology, they generally operate 
within Taylorist work organisational principles. These principles, 
Mathews stresses, are incompatible with the premium on a highly skilled 
and motivated workforce needed to fully exploit a permanent culture of 
innovation and flexibility, or dynamic flexibility. 
Mathews concludes that fordism and Taylorist work organisation are no 
longer relevant to the changing conditions of late-twentieth century 
economies. A more democratic workplace is 'an optimal strategy for 
firms to follow. The participative and democratic workplace then 
becomes .... the most efficient and productive workplace' (Mathews, 
1989a). Mathews goes on to argue that if work democratisation, 
reskilling and an end to the division between conception and execution of 
production functions is the only rational path for firms to pursue in order 
to overcome the crisis of fordism, then enormous opportunities exist for 
the labour movement. These conclusions are 'truly momentous'. The 
fundamental aim of the labour movement, the dignity of labour, now 
becomes compatible with efficiency and rationality in the shift from 
fordist to post-fordist production. In order to exploit this opportunity 
the fordist culture of confrontationist industrial relations must be 
transcended, by one based upon cooperation. A labour movement 
strategy in the face of the post-fordist challenge must 'rest on a notion of 
strategic accommodation between capital and labour. Employers and 
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unions may pursue their own interests, but with a common interest 
defined by the need to develop a flexible, innovative ·and efficient 
industrial system' (Matthews, 1989a). Marxists have criticised Mathews 
on the ground that he fails to address the fundamental contradictions 
between capital and labour, and claim that this 'strategic accommodation' 
is, at best, utopian, or at worst, politically disastrous for the union 
movement (Bramble, 1990). 
Mathews recognises that the merits of his claims rest upon empirical 
examination. Along with his colleague Richard Badham, he has 
developed a three-dimensional model of production systems in an attempt 
to provide a coherent framework for discussing the dynamics of 
industrial change throughout the 1980's (Badham & Mathews, 1989). 
The three production characteristics which they isolate as the key 
detennining variables defining the techno-economic transformation are: 
a) the degree of product innovation; b) process variability; and c) labour 
responsibility (Badham & Mathews, 1989:206). 
l.nbour 
ne1pon1lblllty 
... ,, 
I 
Nao· • j,ordlll 
!•Ulan· 
Figure 1 Three Dimensional Model of Production 
Systems (Badham & Mathews, 1989:207) 
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This model can be applied across industry sectors in order to assess the 
extent to which individual companies or even entire industry sectors have 
implemented the new production systems. On each dimension the highest 
points are associated with a high degree of flexibility and post-fordist 
practices. 
POST-FORDISM AND THE CLOTHING INDUSTRY 
The Study 
Using data gathered as part of the study entitled 'A Local Division Of 
Production: Technological Change and Productive Interlinkages in 
Australian Manufacturing' the rest of this paper will assess Badham and 
Mathews' model. Two questions will be addressed. The first is whether, 
using Badham and Mathews' framework, Australian clothing companies 
are adopting fordist, neo-fordist or post-fordist strategies to deal with 
changing market conditions? The second question is whether the model 
provides insight into technological and operational changes occurring in 
the Australian clothing industry. In other words, does the model capture 
the complexities of organisational change within the industry? 
A sample of 18 case studies was chosen from the clothing section of the 
'Local Division of Production' project for this purpose. These case 
studies were selected on the grounds of their size and importance in the 
Australian industry. While there were some 2,100 clothing companies in 
Australia in 1989, the top ten accounted for approximately one third of 
production and employment. The 18 case studies selected represent 
independent companies or divisions of larger corporations which appear 
within the list of the top ten. These are referred to as 'the principals'. 
Personal interviews, ranging from one to four hours, were conducted 
with production, manufacturing, factory, plant, operation, divisional and 
general managers or managing directors of these 18 companies. All 
interviews were conducted in either New South Wales or Victoria, which 
accounts for the overwhelming majority of Australian clothing 
employment. The response rate from the top ten companies and divisions· 
of corporations was 100%, and in almost all cases information was given 
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openly and willingly. This experience contrasts with many other studies 
of the clothing industry which have experienced low response rates. 
While this problem was experienced with smaller companies and makers-
up in the study, overall it was clear that managers preferred the 
opportunity to discuss issues and problems on a face-to-face level, and 
many expressed dissatisfaction with the quantity of mail-out 
questionnaires they were expected to fill in each week. 
Information was sought on areas relating to the company's structure and 
operations, products and product innovation, customer profiles, 
technology used in the enterprise, changes in the production process, 
inventory control , work organisation and personnel, restructuring, 
relations with suppliers and/or sub-contractors, research and 
development, future strategies and views on government policy and the 
direction of the industry in general. Where appropriate, and depending 
upon the time constraints upon the interviewees, tours of inspection of the 
plants' facilities and operations were also undertaken. 
From the information gathered it is possible to group a number of 
variables under the three dimensions used by Badham and Mathews to 
examine the post-fordist challenge, namely product innovation, process 
variability and labour responsibility. 
Some Relevant Characteristics of the Clothing Industry 
Before examining the data collected in the light of Badham and Mathew>' 
model, some relevant characteristics of the clothing industry should be 
noted. Due to its nature, the industry has always been sensitive to a 
diversified market. Not only does design have to take into consideration 
changing tastes and styles, it has also always been dictated by seasonal and 
climatic factors. This obviously affects some sectors, such as 
outergarments, more than others, such as undergarments and hosiery. 
Another peculiarity of the industry which inhibits product standardisation 
is the fact that the human body comes in a variety of shapes and forms, 
and clothes need to be tailored and manufactured accordingly. Other 
industries, such as automobiles and electronics, do not face the same 
absolute constraints imposed by the body that the clothing industry does. 
(However, style is an important variable here. Periods of loose-fitting 
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clothing are more amenable to product standardisation than skin-tight 
fashions .) 
Another significant characteristic of clothing manufacturing is that the 
principal tool of production, or assembly, namely the sewing machine, 
has remained relatively unaltered since its invention 150 years ago (Plant, 
1981). The industry has remained highly labour-intensive and the nature 
of garment assembly hindered the application of substantial mechanised 
and computerised technological advances. Low-paid female and migrant 
labour characterise clothing employment and training requirements have 
remained low, with employers often relying on skills acquired by 
women, yet not recognised, during earlier periods of socialisation (see 
Elson & Pearson, 1986). 
The Taylorisation of work organisation was adopted well before the 
Second World War (Frances, 1988; Tsokhas, 1989) and remains 
dominant today through the straight line, straight bundle, progressive 
bundle systems and transporter systems. These systems involve the 
breakdown of work tasks to the most simple movements and operations, 
resulting in the fragmentation of skill. In addition, traditional Taylorist 
payment systems ope~:>t"' ·1:~ough payment-by-result (PBR) or piecework, 
meaning that wages are calculated according to the number of individual 
stitching tasks completed daily. 
Taylorisation and the gender characteristics of the workforce have also 
meant that many sections of the industry rely upon sub-contracting and 
outwork for labour. The traditional problems associated with outwork, 
such as control over the labour process, can partly be overcome through 
piecework. Outwork, with its notoriously low rate of unionisation and 
the prevalence of short unstable contracts and irregularity of work, 
means that employers have been able to cope with fluctuations while 
passing on various costs of production to sub-contractors and outworkers. 
Exploitation within this sector is, and always has been, notorious. As 
Probert and Wajcman have noted, the practice of outwork has 
traditionally represented an attempt by employers to 'overcome the 
limitations of inflexible Fordist production systems' (Probert & · 
Wajcman, 1988: 438, see also Phizacklea, 1990: 30). It is estimated that 
outworkers account for between 30% and 60% of the Australian clothing 
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workforce. Labour-intensive industries, such as clothing, have always 
been able to apply this form of numerical flex-ibility or distancing more 
successfully than more mechanised sectcns of industry. Factors 
accounting for this include the transportability of the product and the 
ability of the self-employed worker or outworker to purchase and move 
her principal means of production, the sewing machine, cheaply and 
easily. It would be impractical, if not impossible, to assemble 
automobiles this way. For these reasons, outwork in computer-data entry 
parallels the clothing industry in many respects, through cheap 
transportability of the product (information) and the cheap availability of 
portable home computer terminals. 
Post-Fordist Rhetoric in the Clothing Industry 
However, these traditional features of the clothing industry are 
increasingly being questioned from numerous sources, including 
retaiters, unions and various manufacturing bodies within the OECD. 
Pressures from within the industry and from the market in general are 
beginning to shake garment manufacturing. According to the 1988 
Report of the Technical Advisory Committee of the American Apparel 
Manufacturers Association, 'A revolution is coming to apparel 
manufacturing .... and apparel manufacturing will never look the same 
again' (A.A.M.A., 1988: 1 ). The report lists three 'seeds' from which 
the revolution is growing. These are changes in apparel marketing 
requirements , changes to the labour force and new manufacturing 
alternatives. These three seeds of change resemble Badham and Mathews' 
three-dimensional model of change from fordism to post-fordism. 
changes in marketing requirements -------- product innovation 
changes in the labour force --------------·- labour responsibility 
new manufacturing alternatives ----------- process variability 
With respect to the first revolutionary seed, market changes, the report 
argues that 'the days of mass production to serve mass markets with 
stable products and predictable growth are gone. As the apparel 
marketplace has become segmented into many parts, it has increased in 
complexity and uncertainty. Effective response to market trends has 
emerged as a critical element of a successful manufacturing strategy' 
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(A.A.M.A.·, 1988: 1 ). Manufacturers therefore must 'improve their 
market responsiveness by providing more styles over more seasons in 
smaller quantities to serve larger, more knowledgeable, and more 
demanding retail customers' (A.A.M.A., 1988:2).6 The need for product 
innovation is also being le~ by final consumers. According to the report: 
We are moving from mass to specialised markets. Consumers 
lead more diversified and active lifestyles, and seek specific 
products for specific end uses. Fashion cycles are accelerating, 
and more niche brands are being created. The consumer has 
more interest in apparel as ~ mi!ror of his or her lifestyle than 
ever before, leading to more diversified wardrobes, and 
changing wardrobe mixes. There is more emphasis on image 
and peer approval. Consumers have greater time pressures: 
working women have less time to shop, buy closer to the season, 
are less loyal to brands and retailers, and are more conscious of 
value than ever. before. (A.A.M.A., 1988:2) 
Manufacturers are also having to 'compete for capacity' with retailers 
who are increasingly integrating backwards into manufacturing and 
design and are demanding better service from their manufacturing 
suppliers. 
6 This point needs more attention in the post-fordist literature, especially its relation to the 
concept of 'consumer sovereignty'. Here, it is pertinent to recall Max Weber's comment 
on the relation between production and consumption. 'For purposes of economic 
theory, it is the marginal consumer who determines the direction of production. In 
actual fact. given the actual distribution of power, it is only true in a limited sense for 
the modern situation. To a large degree, even though the consumer has to be in a 
position to buy, his wants are 'awakened' and 'directed' by the entrepreneur' (Weber, 
1978: 92). Andre Gorz made a similar point from a Marxist perspective over twenty 
years ago. 'The consumer is never s.overeign. He is only able to choose between a 
variety of products, but he has no power to bring about the production of other anicles, 
more suited to his needs, in place of those offered to him. The production of the 
superfluous creates and shapes needs at least as much as it fulfills them. The market is 
not a democratic confrontation, on equal terms, between a variety .of offers designed to 
meet them. It is a place where huge production and sales oligopolies, possessing very 
wide powers of decision, encounter a fragmented multiplicity of buyers who, because 
of their dispersed state, are totally powerless to influence the production decisions of 
the firms. The nature of the market prevents it from being a place where collective 
choices can be formed or the collective will asserted. It is a place where fetishized 
products confront their fragmented producers, cut off from their own product, who 
have now become the 'consumers" (Gorz, 1968: 196). 
18 
The second ·seed of the apparel · manufacturing revolution involves the 
development of new manufacturing techniques over the _past. fifteen years. 
Manufacturing systems have been developed and applied to the industry 
through the use of computerised technology in the effort to increase 
flexibility ; reduce throughput time, reduce batch sizes, . reduce 
inventories, increase quality control and develop more sophisticated 
transmission of information flows within the production plant, between 
conception and execution, and between customers and suppliers. These 
systems have already revolutionised design and product initiation 
(through the widespread acceptance of computer-assisted design [CAD]) 
·and pre-assembly (through the use of computerised cutting). While the 
assembly stage remains labour-intensive, bar-coding and tracking systems 
are available which monitor and control throughput time and work-in-
progress. A variety of apparel machine manufacturers are developing 
computer integrated manufacturing . (CIM) systems which will fully 
coordinate all aspects of the clothing production process. 
The third seed of the apparel revolution is the change in the workforce. 
In Australia, as elsewhere, the industry has always relied upon 'waves' of 
migrant labour as a cheap production input. However, given the low 
wages and degradation of work few of the daughters of these workers 
prefer to follow their mothers into the industry. The industry faces 
enormous difficulties retaining its workforce and labour turnover is 
extremely high. As the AAMA Report states, 'apparel's traditional 
approach to manufacturing does not deal well with the new [labour] 
realities. It was developed during a different time, for different workers, 
with different expectations. So long as the apparel manufacturing 
industry remains labour-intensive, it will be faced with an increasingly 
difficult challenge to develop new ways of attracting and retaining 
workers. Indeed some revolutionary changes may be needed; .. .' 
(A.A.M.A., 1988:2). (I assume here that these manufacturers are 
discussing something less radical than the overthrow of existing relations 
of production!) In Australia, the Clothing and Allied Trades Union has 
argued that the only way the industry can survive with lower tariffs -is 
through skills upgrading and better wages. The industry, they argue, 
may end up smaller, but it will be healthier, more responsive and more 
flexible (Textile- and Apparel Index of Australia, 1990: 34 ). 
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Thus, the rhetoric of post-fordism can be found in a mature labour-
intensive industry such as the clothing sector. Indeed, case studies and 
anecdotal evidence often single out specific clothing companies as 
exemplary post-fordist models. The Italian company Benetton, with its 
complex networlCs of sub-contractors and retailers connected through 
information technology, is regarded as a leader in market response 
techniques (Belussi, 1987). The chain of Next retail stores in Britain, 
with its suppliers producing to specification is regarded as a successful 
challenge to the traditional 'stack them high to self them low' approach to 
retailing (Marxism Today, 1988). In Australia, the phenomenal growth 
throughout the 1980's of the manufacturer/retailer Country Road is often 
highlighted as a successful venture into lifestyle niche marketing. In the 
field of work organisation Yakka's Shepparton plant and Stubbies' 
Brisbane plant are often heralded as excellent examples of the the benefits 
which accrue from the application of Just-In-Time (JIT) production 
systems (Hazeldene, 1990). 
However, the question remains concerning the extent to which the 
rhetoric of post-fordism translates itself in the wider reality of changes in 
clothing manufacturing. Through targetting the largest companies with 
the highest turnover it is possible to make a measured estimate of the 
extent and pace of change among those most likely, and most capable, of 
post-fordist adaptations. It would also be expected that these companies 
would, or will be, forced into more flexible manufacturing as the 
traditionally high tariff barriers for clothing are reduced to around 50% 
by the end of the current TCF Plan in in 1995 (see Button, 1987; 
TCFDA, n.d.). How flexible are clothing manufacturers becoming and 
what foFms of flexibility are being introduced? 
Adoption of New Production Techniques 
A useful starting point in examining change, and commitment to change, 
is the extent to which companies have embraced new production 
techniques. These new production techniques associated with post-
fordism include Just-In-Time (JIT), Value-Added Management (VAM) 
Total Quality Control (TQC), Total Quality Management (TQM) and 
Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRPII). 
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Of the 18 principals interviewed, 7 claimed that they had introduced JIT. 
However, it was clear from the interviews and from direct observation of 
the practices on the shopfloor that the interpretation of applying JIT 
varies widely. Of these seven companies it was evident that only 3 had 
introduced JIT as an all-embracing production philosophy. These three 
had to spend at least 18 months on pilot studies and management and 
operator retraining before fully implementing the system. They had also 
introduced JIT in conjunction with other systems such as V AM or TQC 
and had sought outside assistance through organisations such as the 
Technology Transfer Council. One of the three companies which had 
fully embraced JIT added that they wanted to deliver on time and had to 
be 'led, kicking and screaming' down the JIT path by their major retail 
customers. Another stated as a reason for introducing JIT that 'workers 
do not like to be regulated'. It was also evident that for these companies 
introducing JIT had been a prolonged and often difficult experience, but 
one which had thoroughly transformed production practices and work 
organisation. Indeed, the managers recalled the experience in the same 
way soldiers recount their war memories! Furthermore, JIT was viewed 
as an ongoing process, rather than a one-off adaptation, and it was clear 
that some of the companies' factories were more advanced than others. 
In the other four factories which claimed to have introduced JIT, it was 
clear that its implementation had been ad hoe. One stated that 'we're 
taking some of JIT, without going all the way', while another stated that 
'we have JIT, but we haven't bothered about it too much.' Another, 
when asked if JIT had been introduced, remarked, 'As if we haven't 
always been doing it!'. Yet another, while arguing that JIT had been 
introduced in 1983, was in the process of improving their time and 
motion studies (a classic piece of Taylorism) because 'the workers are 
still wasting time'. These four companies still operated on PBR, rather 
than group bonuses which are recommended by JIT. It was evident that 
in these four companies, aspects of JIT had been adopted as an attempt to 
reduce inventories and work-in-progress while retaining a Taylorised 
approach t-0 the shopfloor. 
Apart from these seven companies, another four had introduced other 
systems which. had transformed their production systems to varying 
degrees. One, an internally created system, was introduced to lower 
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stocks and reduce work-in-progress, while another had introduced MRPII 
in order to increase their flexibility and to react more quickly to the 
market. This company also stated that they would introduce JIT 'if our 
suppliers would'. The other two companies had introduced TQM as a 
basis for further change. As one stated, 'So far, it has aided us in 
defining things which just previously happened. It's still early days. It 
helps with training. People are now aware that specifications have to be 
defined for everything you do: definitions; measurement; limits of 
acceptability.' This company was also in the process of creating an in-
house integrated information system. This example was a good 
demonstration of the growing importance of controlling information as 
part of a long-term process of introducing new production systems. 
Thus, out of the 18 principals, 11 claimed to have transformed to some 
extent their production practices, although it was evident that four of 
these 11 companies had done so on a very ad hoe basis. 
Of the seven companies which stated that they had not introduced new 
production systems, one claimed that they had 'a combination of all QC 
systems: TQM, V AM, etc. We pick the eyes out of it', while another 
stated that, while they hadn't introduced any new system, they 'try to do 
what they state, but not formally'. These two companies could be 
bracketed with the four ad hoe JIT implementers. This problem of 
categorisation again stems from the loose interpretation available of what 
constitutes JIT. 
This leaves five companies which had not altered their production 
practices over the past decade. One stated that they had been to JIT and 
TQC seminars but 'had gone no further'. A common response among 
companies was that JIT was not appropriate to their business. One typical 
response was: Tm aware of it, in the sense that to introduce the full 
program is beyond our needs. JIT is appropriate for companies which do 
not do as much product variety. You need to find the right solution to 
suit your business.' Yet, all of the three JIT leaders had increased their 
stockkeeping units (SKU's) over the past five years. One had increased 
the range from 13,000 to 16,000 units (the largest in the study). 
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Thus, while almost all principals were aware of the new production 
systems, only seven could be said to have substantially embraced them, or 
were in the process of embracing them. The rest either 'cannibalised' the 
systems in an attempt to reduce inventory costs or retained their 
· traditional methods of manufacturing. 
Product Innovation 
Despite this, it was evident that the principals had had to respond to 
retailers' demands and a changing market. This was clear from data 
relating to product innovation. Out of the 18 principals interviewed, 16 
stated that they had increased their range of products over the past five 
years. In most cases, the range had increased quite substantially. Ranges 
had increased not only in terms of fashions and styles, but also in the 
areas of fabrics and colours, and targetting a more varied market. Other 
companies had extended their range to cater for the opposite sex. while 
others had branched out into accessories and homeware to consolidate 
their lifestyle niche. A number of companies had also ~their 
range through moving up-market, introducing new labels, (often as a 
franchise from Europe or the U.S.) while others had attempted to tap into 
the growing discount market. Both swimwear companies interviewed 
had also diversified their range into the active sportswear market. Even 
a large suit manufacturer, noted for its conservatism, had a current 
collection (or story) of 30 styles in 30 different fabrics. The reasons 
provided for the increased ranges were usually increasing competition 
and the demands of a more sophisticated market (both retailers and end-
consumers ). The production managers often expressed consternation 
about the widening range. One, from a hosiery company, complained 
that it 'caused stocking headaches'! 
The two firms which had decreased their range of products over the past 
five years were both volume producers for the lower-to-middle end of 
the market. Their approach to the changing marketplace contrasted 
starkly with the other 16 principals. As one claimed, 'Due to the 
Australian clothing price structure, the range of products has been 
decreasing over the years. We are a volume producer, and we want the 
volume part of the market.' On the whole, however, 16 of the 18 
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companies had increased their range through diversification up or out of 
their previous markets. 
Apart from the high fashion sector of the clothing industry, product 
innovation tends to be incremental. In most cases, colours and fabrics 
change, placing a heavy emphasis upon the textile industry for 
innovation. Design and innovation is also tied to the seasons, and this 
affects the length of the process from design through to prototype 
through to the production stage. On average this process took between 4 
and 7 months, although responses varied between one month and one 
year. For most companies marketing had taken a more central role in the 
process, and collections were normally presented to potential clients at 
the prototype stage in order to test market reaction. The conservative 
suit manufacturer mentioned before claimed that his company wasn't 
innovative: their customers were innovating with their bodies, displaying 
bigger guts', :and this had to be taken into consideration in design! 
Another indication of market responsiveness is the extent to which 
companies conduct customised production for particular clients demands. 
Eleven of the 18 principals engaged in this practice: 5 did not, while two 
stated that clients may demand superficial changes to products. There 
were two forms which customised production assumed. The first was 
production for retailers, especially the discounters, and the second was 
corporate apparel (customised designed uniforms for corporations such 
as the banking, finance, tourist, hospitality and other service sectors). 
With respect to the retailers, all the companies in the medium-to-low end 
of the market catered for the specific demands of the discount chains such 
as Target or K-Mart. The more high fashion companies which cater for 
the department stores rarely engage in this service, as design and 
innovation are considered to be their main market strength. 
There has been a growth over the past decade in the production of 
customised collections of corporate apparel. Eight principals engaged in 
this practice, two for manufacturing industry (for example, overalls) and 
four in the service sector. Active sportswear companies also engaged in 
the production of customised collections. Naturally, this practice only 
affects manufacturers of outerwear, as there is no demand for corporate 
collections of underwear. 
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Thirteen of the principals had strategic plans to further diversify their 
range of products in the future. In all but two cases this involved moving 
upmarket in order to create a more varied overall product mix. This 
involved producing 'more labels for more areas'. As one company 
· spokesperson stated, 'If your going to manufacture in Australia you have 
to go up. We'll also import stuff for the discount end.' The other two 
cases were attempting to capture the discount market through 
diversifying downwards. 
Two other companies stated that their diversification over the past five 
years would be consolidated, while one other company, which had 
attempted to diversify from women's outerwear to men's outerwear, 
stated that they would move back to concentrating on womenswear while 
introducing more fabric changes. The two remaining companies, the two 
volume producers which had decreased their range, stated that their 
future market would remain the same, the middle-to-low price range 
bracket. Only one company identified the export market as a strategic 
option for the future, despite the current emphasis on this market by the 
TCF Plan. 
Overall therefore, the overwhelming majority of principals had 
diversified their activities over the past five-to-ten years, mainly through 
moving either up or out of their previous market. For the majority, non-
price factors were an important element of their future strategies. 
Therefore, with respect to product innovation, it can be argued that post-
fordist rhetoric matches the changing realities of the Australian clothing 
industry. 
Process Variability 
The second dimension of Mathews and Badham's model is process 
variability. The following discussion examines the extent to which the 18 
principals have altered their production process to meet the challenges 
outlined above with respect to product diversity. According to post-
fordist theories, markets are changing from being stable to becoming 
more uncertain, and this is putting pressure upon manufacturers to 
increase their flexibility. The instability of the clothing market is 
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reflected in the data collected. Twelve of the 18 principals stated that 
orders from their major customers fluctuated greatly. Most remarked 
that 'the customer commands the situation', which suggests that the 
industry is becoming more market-oriented, moving from a situation 
where manufacturers push products onto the market to one where the 
market pulls products from the manufacturer. Of the remaining six 
companies, two were vertically integrated with their own retail stores 
which absorbed a large proportion of their production. 
These fluctuations demand flexibility in the production process, or 
process variability, in order to cope with both volume changes and 
responsiveness in switching products. Only five companies stated that 
they coped with fluctuations through measures associated with flexible 
manufacturing systems, such as JIT, sophisticated planning systems and 
marketing techniques. As one of these firms stated, 'JIT makes us totally 
flexible. We're now almost totally flexible . We make what we want in 
the season. It's too risky otherwise.' These companies can be said to have 
initiated 'dynamic flexibility' into their process. 
The remainder were forced to supplement their traditional production 
systems in order to achieve 'flexibility', or more accurately , 'static 
flexibility'. Six of the companies systematically used sub-contractors to 
relieve .pressures, and these sub-contractors (and sub-contractors 
outwmb:rs) find their work reduced when customers orders are reduced. 
This helps account for the 'feast or famine' condition of makers up 
(CMTs). Only a tiny handful of makers up in this anarchic section of the 
market can ever feel secure that work will be available tomorrow. Other 
responses to fluctuations included the use of overtime (four cases) , 
holding stock (which increases inventory costs), ensuring that the factory 
runs light on capacity, and labour attrition. One company candidly 
admitted that they couldn't cope with fluctuations because they were 
unable to respond quickly. 
Another indicator of responsiveness and flexibility is lead times. Shorter 
lead times reflect quicker response. Eleven of the 18 companies were 
working on shorter lead times than they were five years ago. Again, the 
JIT leaders recorded the greatest successes in this field. However, the 
figure is higher than those indicating the use of new production systems, 
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suggesting that a number of companies had been able to increase 
flexibility within the confines of their traditional manufacturing systems. 
Shorter lead times were attributed to a number of factors, such as the use 
of JIT, workcells and unit production, 'theories of quick response' and 
. heavy investment in plant and equipment. As noted in an earlier paper, 
most of the principals have invested heavily in computerised design and 
cutting equipment which has substantially reduced lead times in design 
and pre-assembly, while the assembly (or sewing) stage has remained 
highly labour-intensive and Taylorist (Greig, 1990). Four companies 
recorded no change in their lead times while three had actually recorded 
increases in lead times. One, a high fashion company, attributed this 
lengthening to the increasing complexity of their garments, while another 
pointed the finger at the unreliability of delivery from their fabric and 
component suppliers and problems associated with retailers' orders. 1be 
third linked it with their increasing product range, although as noted 
above all except two companies had experienced this change. 
Another indicator of process variability is the length of production runs, 
or the size of batch runs. By implication post-fordist practices should be 
associated with smaller batch runs. Given that a high fashion company 
will have much smaller runs than an underwear company, respondents 
were asked whether batch sizes had been increasing or decreasing over 
the past five years. Again, eleven companies stated that their batch runs 
had decreased. In the majority of cases, this was a conscious attempt to 
control inventory, although one company attributed it to declining sales. 
Two companies' batch sizes hadn't changed, while five companies had 
increased their batch sizes. Three companies attributed the increase to 
the fact that sales had increased considerably over the past five years. 
One company, while acknowledging that larger batch sizes created 
problems, stated that they had 'fixed costs to cover'. The fifth company, 
one of the volume producers, also had increased sales, but indicated that 
there had been a conscious decision to increase runs. 'We move volumes, 
it's more competitive. Then you've got a chance. It's not technically 
feasible otherwise. We've got to do volumes on products. This is the 
message.' Clearly the message depends on the corporate strategy! A 
similar company, which operated a notch up the market, had reduced 
their runs from 5,000 to 400 over the five years. In contrast, the volume 
producer had risen from the same level to 8,000. Once again, the overall 
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reduction suggests that many companies have increased their 
responsiveness within the parameters of fordist production techniques. 
Most interviewees expressed a commitment on the part of their factory to 
reduce lead times and batch sizes. Further longitudinal investigation will 
be needed to determine whether this commitment runs up against the 
rigid barriers imposed by fordism. 
The principals were also asked whether their stock levels had increased 
or decreased over the past five years as a percentage of total production. 
Data was collected relating to stock levels of finished goods, raw 
materials and work-in-progress. A post-fordist strategy, or a JIT 
strategy, aims at operating on zero inventory. The ideal situation is for 
suppliers to arrive at the factory with the inputs 'just in time' for 
processing, and once processed, shipped immediately to the customer. 
Thirteen of the 18 principals had succeeded in reducing work-in-progress 
over the past five years. Three companies recorded stable work-in-
progress, while two companies experienced increases. Of those who 
failed to reduce work-in-progress, two attributed it to growing SKU's, 
while another company simply admitted that the situation was 'horrible'! 
Seven of the principals which had reduced work-in-progress attributed it 
to an awareness of the cost of holding stock, which had forced them to 
reorganise their operations through JIT, V AM or other work 
organisation strategies. 
Eleven of the 18 companies had succeeded in reducing their stocks of 
finished goods inventories. These eleven were all in the category of those 
which had reduced work-in-progress. However, five of the seven 
remaining companies attributed their inability to reduce stocks to 
retailers' strategies. Typical responses included, 'The customer doesn't 
want to carry stock', 'It's all a .part of the retailers' marketing decision 
making'. As retailers begin operating with 'quick response' and JIT they 
refuse to commit themselves to holding stock and are demanding more 
deliveries of smaller orders. This places added pressure upon the 
manufacturer to increase flexibility (Greig, 1990). The remaining 
companies which had increased their stocks of finished goods attributed it 
to their growing SKU's (meaning they were holding the same depth of 
stock in more variety), while one stated that ··stock service ·rather than 
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indent is a larger part of the business now and we also carry more lines.' 
It is significant that this company also had the widest and most fluctuating 
customer profile, servicing upmarket menswear stores. 
It was in the area of raw material inventories where the greatest 
difficulties had been encountered. While all expressed a commitment to 
reduce raw material stocks, only 8 of the 18 principals had recorded 
successes. Five of these eight companies had introduced the most far-
reaching managerial systemic changes, while the other three stated that 
they preferred their suppliers to hold stock in the same way that retailers 
expect the principals to hold stock. Raw material and component 
suppliers are often expected to deliver orders in allotments, tied to 
production requirements. It is in this area of raw material supplies that 
the utility of understanding 'chains of production' becomes important 
when explaining problems associated with managerial systems such as 
JIT. Six companies had retained the same level of raw material stocks 
while four had increased levels. Three of these ten companies attributed 
this inability to reduce stocks to growing SKU's while the remaining 
seven pointed to problems associated with suppliers. One manager stated,. 
'We don't have JIT. One hiccup and you've got problems.' FIVe others 
stated that poor delivery from their suppliers held their stock levels 
above desirable limits. As noted in an earlier paper on the evolving 
relationship between retailers and manufacturers, it was quality and 
delivery problems which pushed retailers to develop closer links with 
their manufacturing suppliers (Greig, 1990). Fostering similar closer 
relationships between manufacturers and raw material and component 
suppliers will be important if the problems manufacturers face in 
implementing new managerial systems are to be overcome. Finally, one 
principal who had increased raw material stocks attributed the increase to 
the use of more imported materials, highlighting the delivery and supply 
problems associated with chains of production involving international 
links. While many low volume high fashion up-market firms air freight 
expensive fabrics from Europe, these costs are prohibitive for larger 
volume middle market producers. Relatedly, a jeans manufacturer who 
had also increased its raw material stocks pointed out that there is only 
one manufacturer of denim in Australia, Bradmill. 
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Thus, with respect to Badham and Mathews' second indicator of post-
fordist change, process variability, the data collected suggests that a 
majority of the principals have been able to respond to market changes 
through reducing lead times, batch sizes and stock levels. However, the 
evidence suggests that many have succeeded in responding more flexibly 
through retaining fordist or neo-fordist procedures and production 
practices. 
Worker Responsibility 
The retention of fordist or neo-fordist practices has been noted above in 
examining the adoption of new managerial systems such as JIT and V AM, 
where only a handful have introduced these practices in an all-embracing 
manner. Clearly, according to Badham and Mathews' model, genuine 
post-fordism, or 'worker-oriented' post-fordism is premised upon 
greater worker participation, their third dimension of change. It is far 
more difficult to quantify the changes which are occurring in this field. 
However, the study, and direct observation, tend to suggest that worker 
participation and involvement in decision-making remains a low priority 
among even the principal clothing companies. Problems associated with 
determining the extent of change are compounded by the ongoing process 
of negotiation between unions and employers as part of award 
restructuring. For the past 18 months both parties have been engaged in 
Joint Working Party talks and many of the principals have established 
consultative committees at the shopfloor level between workers, 
supervisors and management as part of the award restructuring 
procedure. At the time of interviewing, many employers were delaying 
any immediate change until the outcome of the negotiations was clearer. 
As one stated, 'Award restructuring covers a lot of issues. We can't 
make any moves until we know how flexible the award will be.' 
However, seven of the 18 principals stated that they have formal 
shopfloor involvement in production problem solving. Yet, it was clear 
that in a number of these cases this involvement was restricted to the 
setting up of consultative committees. Others, which had consultative 
committees candidly stated that there was no shopfloor involvement in 
their factory. It should also be noted that employer participation in the 
Joint Working Party negotiations has been mainly restricted to 
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discussions with the principals, thus placing greater pressure upon these 
firms to honour their commitment t<;> the process by setting up 
consultative committees. Outside the principals, the committees are 
rarites. Only three companies had processes which resembled quality 
circles. One company stated that formerly they had shopfloor 
involvement, but that the new manager had 'let them slip', indicating the 
extent to which many forms of worker participation are determined by 
the whims of management. 
Few companies had formal training budgets outside the largest two 
principal corporate entities, Pacific Brands and the Linter Group,7 
although many stated that this was 'on the agenda'·. The Dawkins Plan 
will target training at 1 % of payroll, although most companies claim that 
their training costs range from between 2% and 10% of the wage bill. 
One company stated that it cost $2,000 to train each machinist recruit and 
all interviewees stated that each new recruit requires individual in-house 
training to suit the requirements of their particular process. One 
production manager stressed that all of her workers were 'house-trained'! 
High training costs for operators are associated with high labour turnover 
within the industry. Machinist turnover ranged among respondents from 
15% to 100% per annum, with 50-60% turnover being common. 
Turnover averages, however, hide the complexity of the situation within 
factories. Many respondents found the question difficult to answer and 
pointed out that machinists either stay for less than a year or for more 
than 10 years. These long-term employees often form a multiskilled core 
within the factory, and act as trainers, 'room-floaters', or 'trouble-
shooters', performing a variety of functions according to production 
requirements . The method of payment for room-floaters also often 
differed from the standard practice of PBR. 
Five companies stated that they had introduced multiskilling, and there 
was a direct correlation with companies which had introduced new wide-
ranging production systems. One stated that 'we're working closely with 
the unions on horizontal multiskilling. Production planning forces 
7 The interviews were conducted between November 1989 and March 1990. During this 
time the Linter Group went into receivership. 
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multiskilling. Now we have shorter runs. In the past our workers were 
not as flexible.' On the other hand, a strong adv.ocate of JIT warned that 
this form of 'functional flexibility', or horizontal multiskilling, had its 
problems, stating that, 'It can be deskilling to do too many functions', 
while another saw multiskilling as principally a means of 'breaking down 
multiple unionism'. However, all 'multiskillers' acknowledged that it was 
the only way to operate a JIT-type system. 
The majority of managers argued that their workers were not interested 
in multi-skilling and career paths, due to age or family priorities. This 
conflicts with Kim Windsor's report, written for the Australian Textile 
Clothing and Footwear Industry Training Council, where the majority of 
the workers interviewed were interested in doing some kind of training, 
and between 57% and 61 % of the workers wanted more say in their jobs 
(Windsor, 1989). Managements' perception of workers' needs evidently 
conflict with workers' own perception of their needs! 
From the interviews and the data gathered there appears to be little 
indication of a post-fordist mentality among the principals on work 
reorganisation. Given the strength of the unions within these firms and 
their involvement in the Joint Working Parties, it is possible to assume 
that pressure for change would be greater among the principals than 
smaller firms. However, evidence of this dimension of post-fordist 
practices remains thin. 
Other Issues Arising From the Badham and Mathews Model 
Before concluding, one problem associated with the Badham and 
Mathews model should be noted. This relates to the practice of sub-
contracting. Eight of the 18 companies interviewed conducted all aspects 
of the production process within their establishment, or 'in-house', while 
10 used sub-contractors to fulfil various tasks, mainly machining. Two 
of these only sub-contracted out products which were peripheral to their 
core activities, while five others used sub-contracting as a means of 
coping with fluctuations . Due to quality control problems four of these 
five companies had reduced their number of sub-contractors over the past 
five years. 
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However, there were three companies in particular worth looking at, 
which used sub-contractors in a systematic manner as part of their 
production strategy. This can be termed the 'Benetton strategy' (Belussi, 
1987). These companies have targetted and retained their strengths in-
house, in areas such as design and marketing, while hiving-off the labour-
intensive aspects of production, such as assembly, or sewing, to CMT, or 
makers up, sub-contractors. If one analyses these companies on Badham 
and Mathews' model they appear to be some of the companies closest to 
approximating the post-fordist 'ideal', especially on the dimensions of 
worker participation and product variety. However, from interviews and 
observation of their sub-contractors' practices, it is evident that the 
hived-off labour-intensive component of the production process is still 
conducted under the most authoritarian, fordist, Taylorist working 
conditions. Furthermore, the sub-contractors interviewed further sub-
contracted work out to outworkers, where the highest form of 
exploitation and labour degradation exists in the industry. One manager 
admitted that given the amount of work they sub-contract out, these firms 
must be using illegal practices. 
Thus, a company may score well upon Badham and Mathews' post-fordist 
model while at the same time their products are being produced under a 
highly fordist regime of production. From interviews conducted with 
other smaller high fashion companies this strategy appears to be prevalent 
throughout the industry (see also Phizacklea, 1990). Therefore, care 
must be taken when describing individual companies as post-fordist. 
Using the firm as an individual unit of analysis can often lead to highly 
misleading conclusions, unless the analysis takes into consideration the 
strategic interlinkages and alliances these core firms adopt with their sub-
contractors. A company with a highly skilled core workforce can often 
be merely the facade concealing a wide network of secondary peripheral 
workers, many of whom operate under non-award conditions, in isolation 
from their fellow workers and without the benefits and conditions 
applying in the regulated labour market. It is crucial, therefore, that 
analyses of flexibility and the 'flexible firm', take a holistic approach to 
the production process and take into consideration the complex 
organisational linkages between companies rather than examining a 
company as an individual unit of analysis. 
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CONCLUSION 
To conclude, this paper has analysed the concept of post-fordism in the 
light of empirical evidence from the Australian clothing industry. 
Echoes of the claims of an emerging techno-economic paradigmatic shift 
from fordism to post-fordism are reverberating throughout the technical 
clothing literature. The recent Technical Report of the AAMA was used 
to illustrate this. The empirical data presented here suggests that 
important changes have been occurring within the Australian clothing 
industry, especially within the areas of product innovation and process 
variability. Firms have been attempting to introduce a greater degree of 
flexibility into their operations in order to cope with competitive 
pressures and retailers' demands. However, only a small handful have 
embraced advanced production philosophies associated with the post-
fordist paradigm. The majority have increased their flexibility within 
the confines of more traditional, or fordist, production techniques. 
It is upon the 'worker responsibility' axis that Badham and Mathews' 
ideal-type post-fordist model departs most markedly from existing 
reality. There is little evidence of a commitment to greater worker 
participation in production problem-solving. However, this conclusion 
should be qualified by noting that the unions and major employers 
remain engaged in joint-party negotiations over the award restructuring 
process. It is still too early to predict the outcome of these lengthy 
discussions. As Ken Miller from the old Linter Group stated a couple of 
months ago; 'It's still too early to tell if there is light at the end of the 
tunnel, or a train coming in the opposite direction.' The nature of this 
light could well determine the future parameters of industrial democracy 
within the industry. 
Finally, the paper issued a cautionary note into the employment of 
Badham and Mathews' post-fordism model. Examining companies using 
an extensive network of sub-contractors (labelled the Benetton approach), 
it was pointed out that many 'post-fordist-leaning' companies were 
merely a facade covering extensively fordist production techniques. 
Employing the jargon of the sociology of development (especially 
dependency theory and world systems analysis) the underdeveloped 
fordism of one sector of the industry is an integral part of the 'post-
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fordist' development of another sector. In this regard, the clothing 
industry appears to be regulated by a law of 'combined and uneven 
development' (Rainnie, 1984), and strategic interlinkages between firms 
must be taken into consideration when assessing industrial restructuring 
within the clothing industry. 
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